Well, we finally have our metrics for winning the war Afghanistan. All 46 of them. Or, more accurately, 46+, since there an undefined number of classified metrics as well. Call it 50 in round numbers.
Some of them are ridiculously vague. For example, “Status of relations between Afghanistan and its other neighbors,” whatever that means. Some are at 
least theoretically measurable: “Volume and value of narcotics.” Some have already been missed: “Afghan Government’s… ability to hold credible elections in 2009 and 2010.” Some are darkly humorous: “Development of an enduring, strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan.”
I don’t know what to think about this. I just don’t know. It’s not like I’m against the idea of setting out specific goals and trying to measure how well we’re achieving them. On the other hand, if you wanted to resurrect the ghost of Robert McNamara and convince everyone that Afghanistan is Vietnam 2.0, you could hardly do a better job than this list. I don’t doubt for a second that McNamara had something exactly like it in 1965 when he was meeting with LBJ and the Joint Chiefs in the Oval Office.
Still, if I had to pick out the one thing that bothers me most about this plan, it’s how implicitly utopian it is. We’re not just trying to kill some terrorists here, we’re apparently trying to turn both Pakistan and Afghanistan into thriving, peaceful, incorruptible, Westernized democracies. But that’s a hundred-year project, and it’s not something we’ve ever demonstrated much skill at. So what, exactly, makes us think we’re going to be good at it this time around?
